Description of Campaign
Threat actors have targeted Rust developers in a supply-chain attack that made use of a typo-squatted package URL to deliver the pen-testing tool Poseidon. The malicious package posed as a legitimate package of the same name "rust_decimal," but omitted the underscore character from the malicious package name. Although the final payload was Poseidon, the campaign objective is yet to be identified, but might be an attempt to infect multiple organizations through a supply chain.
Our ATR Team gathers and analyzes information from multiple open and closed sources before disseminating intelligence reports. This campaign was researched by SentinelOne and
shared publicly.
How to use this article:
- Scroll down and review the Product Countermeasures section of this article. Consider implementing them if they are not already in place.
- Review the following articles:
This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that's being tracked. The list of IOCs will change over time; check Trellix Insights for the latest IOCs.
Campaign IOC
| Type |
Value |
| DOMAIN |
githubio.codes |
| URL |
https://api.githubio.codes/v2/id/f6d50b696cc427893a53f94b1c3adc99/READMEv2.bin |
| URL |
https://api.githubio.codes/v2/id/f6d50b696cc427893a53f94b1c3adc99/README.bin |
| HOSTNAME |
api.kakn.li |
Minimum set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Endpoint Security - Advanced Threat Protection:
Rule ID: 5 Use GTI URL reputation to identify trusted or malicious processes
