Trellix Insights: Mindware and SFile Ransomware Technical Breakdown
Technical Articles ID:
KB95808
Last Modified: 2022-08-23 05:40:59 Etc/GMT
Last Modified: 2022-08-23 05:40:59 Etc/GMT
Environment
IMPORTANT: This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that is being automatically tracked by Trellix Insights technology. The content is intended for use by Trellix Insights users, but is provided for general knowledge to all customers. Contact us for more information about Trellix Insights.
Summary
Description of Campaign
The Mindware ransomware family was discovered in early 2022 and shares similarities with SFile ransomware.
Both samples requirekernel32.dll and ntdll.dll; encrypt internal, removable, and remote drives; and terminate processes if needed. Mindware is known to have attacked organizations in the healthcare, finance, engineering, and manufacturing sectors.
Our ATR Team gathers and analyzes information from multiple open and closed sources before disseminating intelligence reports. This campaign was researched by SentinelOne and shared publicly.
How to use this article:
This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that's being tracked. The list of IOCs will change over time; check Trellix Insights for the latest IOCs.
Campaign IOC
Minimum Content Versions
Detection Summary
Minimum set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Endpoint Security - Advanced Threat Protection:Rule ID: 239 Identify suspicious command parameter execution
Rule ID: 4 Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious files
Endpoint Security - Exploit Prevention:Rule ID: 8004 Fileless Threat: Malicious PowerShell Behavior Detected
Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Rule ID: 6113 T1055 - Fileless Threat: Reflective Self Injection
Rule ID: 6127 Suspicious LSASS Access from PowerShell
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6081 PowerShell Command Restriction - NoProfile
Rule ID: 6143 T1003 - Attempt to Dump Password Hash from SAM Database
Host Intrusion Prevention:Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Rule ID: 6113 T1055 - Fileless Threat: Reflective Self Injection
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6081 PowerShell Command Restriction - NoProfile
Aggressive set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
VirusScan Enterprise - Access Protection Rules:Prevent programs registering as a service
Prevent creation of new executable files in the Windows folder
Host Intrusion Prevention:Rule ID: 6010 Generic Application Hooking Protection
Rule ID: 6053 Accessing other users home directory
Rule ID: 6011 Generic Application Invocation Protection
Rule ID: 1001 Windows Agent Shielding - File Modification
Rule ID: 1020 Windows Agent Shielding - File Access
Rule ID: 1148 CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware Application
Endpoint Security - Access Protection Rules:Creating new executable files in the Windows folder
The Mindware ransomware family was discovered in early 2022 and shares similarities with SFile ransomware.
Both samples require
Our ATR Team gathers and analyzes information from multiple open and closed sources before disseminating intelligence reports. This campaign was researched by SentinelOne and shared publicly.
How to use this article:
- If a Threat Hunting table has been created, use the rules contained to search for malware related to this campaign.
- Review the product detection table and confirm that your environment is at least on the specified content version.
To download the latest content versions, go to the Security Updates page. - Scroll down and review the "Product Countermeasures" section of this article. Consider implementing them if they are not already in place.
- Review
KB91836 - Countermeasures for entry vector threats . - Review KB87843 - Dynamic Application Containment rules and best practices.
- Review KB82925 - Identify what rule corresponds to an Adaptive Threat Protection and Threat Intelligence Exchange event.
{ meta: id = "64arpb3yJ0mZxamCG9jIVs" fingerprint = "7a2be690f14a9ea61917c2c31b4d44186295de7d8a1342f081ed9507a8ac46b0" version = "1.0" creation_date = "2020-09-01" first_imported = "2021-12-30" last_modified = "2021-12-30" status = "RELEASED" sharing = "TLP:WHITE" source = "BARTBLAZE" author = "@bartblaze" description = "Identifies Sfile aka Escal ransomware." category = "MALWARE" malware_type = "RANSOMWARE" strings: $pdb = "D:\\code\\ransomware_win\\bin\\ransomware.pdb" ascii wide $ = "%s SORTING time : %s" ascii wide $ = "%ws -> WorkModeDecryptFiles : %d of %d files decrypted +%d (%d MB)..." ascii wide $ = "%ws -> WorkModeEncryptFiles : %d of %d files encrypted +%d [bps : %d, size = %d MB] (%d skipped, ld = %d.%d.%d %d:%d:%d, lf = %ws)..." ascii wide $ = "%ws -> WorkModeEnded" ascii wide $ = "%ws -> WorkModeFindFiles : %d files / %d folders found (already (de?)crypted %d/%d) (lf = %ws)..." ascii wide $ = "%ws -> WorkModeSorting" ascii wide $ = "%ws ENCRYPTFILES count : %d (%d skipped), time : %s" ascii wide $ = "%ws FINDFILES RESULTS : dwDirectoriesCount = %d, dwFilesCount = %d MB = %d (FIND END)" ascii wide $ = "%ws FINDFILES time : %s" ascii wide $ = "DRIVE_FIXED : %ws" ascii wide $ = "EncryptDisk(%ws) DONE" ascii wide $ = "ScheduleRoutine() : gogogo" ascii wide $ = "ScheduleRoutine() : waiting for sacred time... Expecting %d hours, now id %d" ascii wide $ = "WARN! FileLength more then memory has %ws" ascii wide $ = "WaitForHours() : gogogo" ascii wide $ = "WaitForHours() : waiting for sacred time... Expecting %d hours, now id %d" ascii wide $ = "Your network has been penetrated." ascii wide $ = "--kill-susp" ascii wide $ = "--enable-shares" ascii wide condition: $pdb or 3 of them } |
|
meta: description = "Detects a unspecified hack tool, crack or malware using a reflective loader - no hard match - further investigation recommended" reference = "Internal Research" score = 70 date = "2017-07-17" modified = "2021-03-15" author = "Florian Roth" nodeepdive = 1 strings: $x1 = "ReflectiveLoader" fullword ascii $x2 = "ReflectivLoader.dll" fullword ascii $x3 = "?ReflectiveLoader@@" ascii $x4 = "reflective_dll.x64.dll" fullword ascii $x5 = "reflective_dll.dll" fullword ascii $fp1 = "Sentinel Labs, Inc." wide $fp2 = "Panda Security, S.L." wide ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ( 1 of ($x*) or pe.exports("ReflectiveLoader") or pe.exports("_ReflectiveLoader@4") or pe.exports("?ReflectiveLoader@@YGKPAX@Z") ) and not 1 of ($fp*) } |
This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that's being tracked. The list of IOCs will change over time; check Trellix Insights for the latest IOCs.
Campaign IOC
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Minimum Content Versions
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Minimum set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Endpoint Security - Advanced Threat Protection:
Rule ID: 4 Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious files
Endpoint Security - Exploit Prevention:
Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Rule ID: 6113 T1055 - Fileless Threat: Reflective Self Injection
Rule ID: 6127 Suspicious LSASS Access from PowerShell
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6081 PowerShell Command Restriction - NoProfile
Rule ID: 6143 T1003 - Attempt to Dump Password Hash from SAM Database
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Rule ID: 6113 T1055 - Fileless Threat: Reflective Self Injection
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6081 PowerShell Command Restriction - NoProfile
Aggressive set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
VirusScan Enterprise - Access Protection Rules:
Prevent creation of new executable files in the Windows folder
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Rule ID: 6053 Accessing other users home directory
Rule ID: 6011 Generic Application Invocation Protection
Rule ID: 1001 Windows Agent Shielding - File Modification
Rule ID: 1020 Windows Agent Shielding - File Access
Rule ID: 1148 CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware Application
Endpoint Security - Access Protection Rules: