Trellix Insights: Cyberattack by Sandworm Group on energy facilities of Ukraine using malicious programs INDUSTROYER2 and CADDYWIPER
Technical Articles ID:
KB95656
Last Modified: 2022-08-26 05:56:52 Etc/GMT
Last Modified: 2022-08-26 05:56:52 Etc/GMT
Environment
IMPORTANT: This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that is being automatically tracked by Trellix Insights technology. The content is intended for use by Trellix Insights users, but is provided for general knowledge to all customers. Contact us for more information about Trellix Insights.
Summary
Description of Campaign
Our ATR Team gathers and analyzes information from multiple open and closed sources before disseminating intelligence reports. This campaign was researched by CERT-UA and shared publicly on April 12, 2022.
The following is translated from the original.
The Governmental Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine CERT-UA has taken urgent measures to respond to an information security incident related to a targeted attack on Ukraine's energy facility.
The idea of the attackers involved the decommissioning of several infrastructural elements of the object of attack, namely:
The POWERGAP PowerShell script was used to add a Group Policy that downloads file destructor components from a domain controller and creates a scheduled task on a computer.
The ability to move horizontally between segments of the local area network is provided by creating chains of SSH tunnels. IMPACKET is used for remote execution of commands.
It's known that the victim organization suffered two waves of attacks. The initial compromise took place no later than February 2022. The disconnection of electrical substations and decommissioning of the company's infrastructure was scheduled for Friday evening, April 8, 2022. At the same time, the implementation of the malicious plan has so far been prevented.
How to use this article:
Campaign IOC
Minimum Content Versions
Detection Summary
Minimum set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Endpoint Security - Advanced Threat Protection:Rule ID: 4 Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious files
Rule ID: 239 Identify suspicious command parameter execution
Host Intrusion Prevention:Rule ID: 6081 PowerShell Command Restriction - NoProfile
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Rule ID: 6113 T1055 - Fileless Threat: Reflective Self Injection
Rule ID: 6096 PowerShell Command Restriction - InvokeExpression
Aggressive set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
VirusScan Enterprise - Access Protection Rules:Prevent creation of new executable files in the Windows folder
Host Intrusion Prevention:Rule ID: 6010 Generic Application Hooking Protection
Rule ID: 1148 CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware Application
Rule ID: 1020 Windows Agent Shielding - File Access
Rule ID: 6011 Generic Application Invocation Protection
Rule ID: 2806 Attempt to create a hardlink to a file
Our ATR Team gathers and analyzes information from multiple open and closed sources before disseminating intelligence reports. This campaign was researched by CERT-UA and shared publicly on April 12, 2022.
The following is translated from the original.
The Governmental Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine CERT-UA has taken urgent measures to respond to an information security incident related to a targeted attack on Ukraine's energy facility.
The idea of the attackers involved the decommissioning of several infrastructural elements of the object of attack, namely:
- High-voltage electrical substations, using the malicious program INDUSTROYER2.
Also, each executable file contained a statically specified set of unique parameters for the respective substations (file compilation date: 23.03.2022).
- Electronic computers (computers) running the Windows operating system (user computers, servers, as well as automated workstations ACS TP) — using the malicious program-destructor CADDYWIPER.
In this case, the decryption and launch of the latter involves the use of the ARGUEPATCH loader and the TAILJUMP silkcode.
- Server equipment running Linux operating systems — using malicious destructive scripts ORCSHRED, SOLOSHRED, AWFULSHRED.
- Active network equipment.
The POWERGAP PowerShell script was used to add a Group Policy that downloads file destructor components from a domain controller and creates a scheduled task on a computer.
The ability to move horizontally between segments of the local area network is provided by creating chains of SSH tunnels. IMPACKET is used for remote execution of commands.
It's known that the victim organization suffered two waves of attacks. The initial compromise took place no later than February 2022. The disconnection of electrical substations and decommissioning of the company's infrastructure was scheduled for Friday evening, April 8, 2022. At the same time, the implementation of the malicious plan has so far been prevented.
How to use this article:
- If a Threat Hunting table has been created, use the rules contained to search for malware related to this campaign.
- Review the product detection table and confirm that your environment is at least on the specified content version.
To download the latest content versions, go to the Security Updates page. - Scroll down and review the "Product Countermeasures" section of this article. Consider implementing them if they are not already in place.
- Review
KB91836 - Countermeasures for entry vector threats . - Review KB87843 - Dynamic Application Containment rules and best practices.
- Review KB82925 - Identify what rule corresponds to an Adaptive Threat Protection and Threat Intelligence Exchange event.
Campaign IOC
Type | Value |
Minimum Content Versions
Content Type | Version |
Detection Summary
IOC | Scanner | Detection |
IOC | Scanner | Detection |
IOC | Scanner | Detection |
Minimum set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Endpoint Security - Advanced Threat Protection:
Rule ID: 239 Identify suspicious command parameter execution
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Rule ID: 6113 T1055 - Fileless Threat: Reflective Self Injection
Rule ID: 6096 PowerShell Command Restriction - InvokeExpression
Aggressive set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
VirusScan Enterprise - Access Protection Rules:
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Rule ID: 1148 CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware Application
Rule ID: 1020 Windows Agent Shielding - File Access
Rule ID: 6011 Generic Application Invocation Protection
Rule ID: 2806 Attempt to create a hardlink to a file
CORE 1684