Trellix Insights: IcedID utilized to infect systems with Conti Ransomware
Technical Articles ID:
KB95624
Last Modified: 2022-08-26 09:31:04 Etc/GMT
Last Modified: 2022-08-26 09:31:04 Etc/GMT
Environment
IMPORTANT: This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that is being automatically tracked by Trellix Insights technology. The content is intended for use by Trellix Insights users, but is provided for general knowledge to all customers. Contact us for more information about Trellix Insights.
Summary
Description of Campaign
The IcedID trojan was utilized in an attack campaign to infect systems with Conti ransomware. The threat actor behind the operation carried out the infection process using Cobalt Strike beacons and Mimikatz, NanoDump, MirrorDump, or HandleKatz to steal credentials. The adversary also used Splashtop Streamer via the Atera agent to establish a backdoor and multiple living-off-the-land binaries (LoLBins) to stay under the radar.
Our ATR Team gathers and analyzes information from multiple open and closed sources before disseminating intelligence reports. This campaign was researched by DFIR and shared publicly.
How to use this article:
This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that's being tracked. The list of IOCs will change over time; check Trellix Insights for the latest IOCs.
Campaign IOC
Minimum Content Versions
Detection Summary
Minimum set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Endpoint Security - Advanced Threat Protection:Rule ID: 4 Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious files
Host Intrusion Prevention:Rule ID: 6081 PowerShell Command Restriction - NoProfile
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6113 T1055 - Fileless Threat: Reflective Self Injection
Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Aggressive set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
VirusScan Enterprise - Access Protection Rules:Prevent creation of new executable files in the Windows folder
Host Intrusion Prevention:Rule ID: 6011 Generic Application Invocation Protection
Rule ID: 1020 Windows Agent Shielding - File Access
Rule ID: 1148 CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware Application
Rule ID: 6010 Generic Application Hooking Protection
The IcedID trojan was utilized in an attack campaign to infect systems with Conti ransomware. The threat actor behind the operation carried out the infection process using Cobalt Strike beacons and Mimikatz, NanoDump, MirrorDump, or HandleKatz to steal credentials. The adversary also used Splashtop Streamer via the Atera agent to establish a backdoor and multiple living-off-the-land binaries (LoLBins) to stay under the radar.
Our ATR Team gathers and analyzes information from multiple open and closed sources before disseminating intelligence reports. This campaign was researched by DFIR and shared publicly.
How to use this article:
- If a Threat Hunting table has been created, use the rules contained to search for malware related to this campaign.
- Review the product detection table and confirm that your environment is at least on the specified content version.
To download the latest content versions, go to the Security Updates page. - Scroll down and review the "Product Countermeasures" section of this article. Consider implementing them if they are not already in place.
- Review
KB91836 - Countermeasures for entry vector threats . - Review KB87843 - Dynamic Application Containment rules and best practices.
- Review KB82925 - Identify what rule corresponds to an Adaptive Threat Protection and Threat Intelligence Exchange event.
YARA Rule Set Author: The DFIR Report Date: 2022-04-04 Identifier: 9438 conti Reference: https://thedfirreport.com/2022/04/04/stolen-images-campaign-ends-in-conti-ransomware/ */ /* Rule Set ----------------------------------------------------------------- */ rule cs_exe_9438 { meta: description = "9438 - file Faicuy4.exe" author = "TheDFIRReport" reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/04/04/stolen-images-campaign-ends-in-conti-ransomware/" date = "2022-04-04" hash1 = "a79f5ce304707a268b335f63d15e2d7d740b4d09b6e7d095d7d08235360e739c" strings: $x1 = "C:\\Users\\Administrator\\Documents\\Visual Studio 2008\\Projects\\MUTEXES\\x64\\Release\\MUTEXES.pdb" fullword ascii $s2 = "mutexes Version 1.0" fullword wide $s3 = " $s4 = ".?AVCMutexesApp@@" fullword ascii $s5 = ".?AVCMutexesDlg@@" fullword ascii $s6 = "About mutexes" fullword wide $s7 = "Mutexes Sample" fullword wide $s8 = " 1992 - 2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved." fullword wide $s9 = "&Process priority class:" fullword wide $s10 = " Type Descriptor'" fullword ascii $s11 = "&About mutexes..." fullword wide $s12 = " constructor or from DllMain." fullword ascii $s13 = ".?AVCDisplayThread@@" fullword ascii $s14 = "IsQ:\"P" fullword ascii $s15 = "CExampleThread" fullword ascii $s16 = ".?AVCCounterThread@@" fullword ascii $s17 = ".?AVCExampleThread@@" fullword ascii $s18 = " $s19 = "CDisplayThread" fullword ascii $s20 = "CCounterThread" fullword ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 2000KB and 1 of ($x*) and 4 of them } rule conti_dll_9438 { meta: description = "9438 - file x64.dll" author = "TheDFIRReport" reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/04/04/stolen-images-campaign-ends-in-conti-ransomware/" date = "2022-04-04" hash1 = "8fb035b73bf207243c9b29d96e435ce11eb9810a0f4fdcc6bb25a14a0ec8cc21" strings: $s1 = "AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod" fullword ascii $s2 = "conti_v3.dll" fullword ascii $s3 = " $s4 = "api-ms-win-core-processthreads-l1-1-2" fullword wide $s5 = "ext-ms-win-ntuser-dialogbox-l1-1-0" fullword wide $s6 = " Type Descriptor'" fullword ascii $s7 = "operator \"\" " fullword ascii $s8 = "operator co_await" fullword ascii $s9 = " $s10 = "api-ms-win-rtcore-ntuser-window-l1-1-0" fullword wide $s11 = "api-ms-win-security-systemfunctions-l1-1-0" fullword wide $s12 = "ext-ms-win-ntuser-windowstation-l1-1-0" fullword wide $s13 = "api-ms-win-appmodel-runtime-l1-1-2" fullword wide $s14 = " Base Class Descriptor at (" fullword ascii $s15 = " Class Hierarchy Descriptor'" fullword ascii $s16 = "bad array new length" fullword ascii $s17 = " Complete Object Locator'" fullword ascii $s18 = ".data$r" fullword ascii $s19 = " delete[]" fullword ascii $s20 = " condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 700KB and all of them |
This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that's being tracked. The list of IOCs will change over time; check Trellix Insights for the latest IOCs.
Campaign IOC
Type | Value |
Minimum Content Versions
Content Type | Version |
Detection Summary
IOC | Scanner | Detection |
Minimum set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Endpoint Security - Advanced Threat Protection:
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6113 T1055 - Fileless Threat: Reflective Self Injection
Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Aggressive set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
VirusScan Enterprise - Access Protection Rules:
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Rule ID: 1020 Windows Agent Shielding - File Access
Rule ID: 1148 CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware Application
Rule ID: 6010 Generic Application Hooking Protection